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I. INTRODUCTION
For many people, law is simply law: a set of rules that a given
society creates, by whatever process, for itself and its members to live
by.1 It is a tool, an instrument, a set of institutions, a system for
achieving social goals.2 Perhaps because law pervades daily life and
structures routine encounters, even those who live and work within a
legal system may only rarely consider larger questions regarding the
nature of law. It is easy to be satisfied with a view of law as statutes and
cases, lawyers and courts, police and prisons. Despite the prevalence of
this straightforward view, it is evident that there are deeper complexities,
even contradictions, in the law—in its structures, objectives, practices,
and participants. These have increasingly been recognized and
interrogated by social and legal theorists, most frequently in the context
of a single nation-state or government. However, those complexities
may be even more prominent, and significant, in the international realm.
International law appears to lack many of the familiar institutions of
domestic law, and the question is often raised whether international law
is really law at all.3 An understanding of law as more than an instrument
or particular system offers more productive means of considering that
question.
Drawing upon diverse scholars of law from various disciplines, this
article traces three central themes that emerge to theorize law as multidimensional: law as violence, law as bureaucracy, and law as
governance.4 Understanding violence as a dimension of law moves
1. See Patricia M. Wald, Violence Under the Law: A Judge’s Perspective, in LAW’S
VIOLENCE 77, 77-104 (Austin Sarat & Thomas R. Kearns eds., 1995).
2. See Annelise Riles, Anthropology, Human Rights, and Legal Knowledge: Culture in the
Iron Cage, 108 AMERICAN ANTHROPOLOGIST 52, 52-65 (2006). See generally, MAX WEBER,
Economy and Law (Sociology of Law), in ECONOMY AND SOCIETY: AN OUTLINE OF INTERPRETIVE
SOCIOLOGY 641, 641-900 (Guenther Roth & Claus Wittich eds., 1978).
3. ANNE ORFORD, READING HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE USE
OF FORCE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 72 (2003).
4. These themes emerge dominantly in the work of Walter Benjamin, Jacques Derrida, Max
Weber, and Michel Foucault, respectively. For a discussion of law-making and law-preserving
violence, see WALTER BENJAMIN, Critique of Violence, in REFLECTIONS 277, 277-300 (Peter
Demetz ed., Schocken Books Inc. 1986) (1921); Jacques Derrida, Force de Loi: Le “Fondement
Mystique de L’autorité” [Force of Law: The “Mystical Foundation of Authority”], 11 CARDOZO L.
REV. 919, 919-1045 (1989-1990). For an elaboration of the role of bureaucracy in law, see MAX
WEBER, The Development of Bureaucracy and its Relation to Law, in MAX WEBER: SELECTIONS IN
TRANSLATION 341, 341-54 (W.G. Runciman ed., E. Matthews trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1978)
(1922); Max Weber, Bureaucracy, in CLASSICAL SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY 264, 264-73 (Craig
Calhoun et al. eds., Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 2d Ed. 2007) (1922); see also STEPHEN P. TURNER &
REGIS A. FACTOR, MAX WEBER: THE LAWYER AS SOCIAL THINKER (1994). For an examination of
the rise of governance in relation to law, see MICHEL FOUCAULT, Governmentality, in THE
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beyond traditional views of law as an alternative to and bulwark against
violence (particularly the violence of individual offenders). Instead,
“law as violence” foregrounds the originating and sustaining force that
underlies the creation and maintenance of law (and the state) as well as
law’s deliberate use of violence.5 Bureaucracy as a dimension of law—
“law as bureaucracy”—focuses on the rationalization of law and its
processes, and the ways in which it works through the expertise of
individuals and institutions.6 Finally, “law as governance” recognizes
the diffusion of law into a wider range of projects of reform and
management both within and outside of the formal mechanisms of the
law and the state.7 These are neither necessarily alternative nor
exhaustive views of law, but rather reflect significant and often
overlapping features of law and legality.
International law well-illustrates this more nuanced understanding
of law. This article will consider humanitarian interventions conducted
in the name of human rights and the ‘rule of law’ to illuminate the multidimensional nature of law as violence, bureaucracy, and governance.
Typically in humanitarian intervention, a group of nations (often under
the aegis of an inter-governmental organization such as the United
Nations) uses force or the threat of force against another nation in the
interest of protecting that nation’s citizens based upon a judgment that
the nation is either unwilling or unable to do so itself.8 This is law’s
violence—serving both to counter and constrain violence considered
outside the law as well as to create and maintain a new legal order.
Once the international presence has established itself by threat or force,
it begins to (re)build the nation through an on-going presence or field
mission. This is law’s bureaucracy, which imports both a new legal
system and a range of experts to administer it. The end goal of such an
intervention is to establish a process of governance of the local
ESSENTIAL FOUCAULT: SELECTIONS FROM ESSENTIAL WORKS OF FOUCAULT, 1954-1984, at 229-45
(Paul Rabinow & Nikolas Rose eds., 1994); ALAN HUNT & GARY WICKHAM, FOUCAULT AND LAW:
TOWARDS A NEW SOCIOLOGY OF LAW AS GOVERNANCE 99 (1994).
5. For a discussion of law-making and law-preserving violence, see BENJAMIN, supra note 4,
at 277-300; Derrida, supra note 4, at 919-1045.
6. For an elaboration of the role of bureaucracy in law, see WEBER, The Development of
Bureaucracy and its Relation to Law, in MAX WEBER: SELECTIONS IN TRANSLATION, supra note 4,
at 341-354; Weber, Bureaucracy, in CLASSICAL SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY, supra note 4, at 264-73;
see also TURNER & FACTOR, supra note 4.
7. For an examination of the rise of governance in relation to law, see FOUCAULT, supra note
4, at 229-245; HUNT & WICKHAM, supra note 4.
8. See PATRICIA MARCHAK, NO EASY FIX: GLOBAL RESPONSES TO INTERNAL WARS AND
CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY 6 (2008); HILARY CHARLESWORTH & CHRISTINE CHINKIN, THE
BOUNDARIES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: A FEMINIST ANALYSIS 268-70 (2000).
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population—law as governance—first by international administrators
and increasingly in conjunction with a range of ‘civil society’
organizations, until the nation has been determined to be capable again
of self-governance.
Recent years have seen such interventions in Bosnia, Kosovo,
Rwanda, Sierra Leone, East Timor, and elsewhere.9 In the field,
international policymakers and advocates typically adopt an approach
that attempts to blend pragmatism with idealism.10 Law appears in its
familiar guise as a tool to be wielded in the interests of the greater good.
While this may reflect intentions (if not always reality), it seldom allows
for a more critical or nuanced view. Instead, it leads to an understanding
of intervention based on human rights or humanitarian grounds as, at
best, an attempt to (re)establish the “rule of law” and to (re)build the
nation, and at worst, as a well-intentioned choice to avoid the greater
evil of “doing nothing” in response to crisis.11 But there remain more
fundamental questions to examine. What is the “rule of law” in such a
context? What does it mean to establish law (and human rights) through
forceful intervention? How is law deployed in international projects of
governance? As this article elaborates a theory of law’s multidimensional nature, it will engage with these questions in the context of
international interventions.
In Part II, this article will explore law’s relationship with violence.
It will briefly examine conventional views that position law as a restraint
upon or selective and judicious dispenser of violence as well as more
critical views that explore the enmeshed nature of law and violence. It
will then discuss contemporary humanitarian interventions and human
rights institutions and practices, and their historical antecedents, to
surface international law’s violence. In Part III, this article will discuss
the ways in which law’s force becomes subject to bureaucratic, technical
considerations with the increasing rationalization of law. In the context
of international interventions, it will elaborate the importation of
“rational” international legal regimes and the deployment of “objective”
international experts to establish and manage such regimes and to train
local participants in these new procedures and practices. Part IV will

9. HUMAN RIGHTS FIELD OPERATIONS, LAW, THEORY AND PRACTICE (Michael O’Flaherty
ed., 2007); MARCHAK, supra note 8; SHERENE H. RAZACK, DARK THREATS AND WHITE KNIGHTS:
THE SOMALIA AFFAIR, PEACEKEEPING, AND THE NEW IMPERIALISM (2004).
10. See DAVID KENNEDY, THE DARK SIDES OF VIRTUE: REASSESSING INTERNATIONAL
HUMANITARIANISM (2004); MARGARET E. KECK & KATHRYN SIKKINK, ACTIVISTS BEYOND
BORDERS: ADVOCACY NETWORKS IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS (1998).
11. RAZACK, supra note 9, at 150.
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focus on the deployment of law as a technique in projects of governance
and the roles of experts in creating, facilitating, and maintaining
networks and practices of reform and management. Humanitarian
interventions begin as the projects of states and inter-governmental
organizations but expand to include larger and more diffuse networks of
actors. The article will conclude by returning to the larger questions of
international law and contending that understanding the integration of
law’s violence with projects and institutions of bureaucracy and
governance is essential for answering those questions as well as for an
appropriately complex appraisal of humanitarian intervention in the
contemporary environment.
II. THE FORCE OF LAW: LAW AS VIOLENCE IN HUMANITARIAN
INTERVENTION
It may be easiest to imagine the connections between law and
violence in the context of criminal law with its fierce debates about the
scope and purposes of punishment, including the ultimate measure of the
death penalty, or the treatment of prisoners and the conditions of their
incarceration.12 However, the relationship of law and violence is more
encompassing, more complex, and more contested. Conventional views
position law in opposition to violence, as a restraint upon violence, or, at
most, as a deliberate and impartial dispenser of violence. In many
circumstances, for many participants in legal processes and institutions,
those views are accurate and adequate. Nonetheless, there are important
critical voices that challenge these understandings, both to problematize
more benevolent views and to articulate the complicated ways in which
law and violence are enmeshed. This section will consider both
conventional and critical views of law and violence before examining
their relationship in the context of international law and humanitarian
intervention.
A.

Law as a Civilizer of Violence

Under the conventional view, law and violence are connected, but
law domesticates, channels, and justifies violence. Not all violence is
equal; there is a fundamental distinction between violence used for just
12. See ROBERT COVER, Violence and the Word, in NARRATIVE, VIOLENCE, AND THE LAW:
THE ESSAYS OF ROBERT COVER 203, 203-38 (Martha Minow, Michael Ryan, & Austin Sarat eds.,
1992) (using the criminal trial and death penalty as examples); Wald, supra note 1, at 77-104
(discussing the criminal trial); MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE
PRISON (1975) (tracing the origins of punishment and the emergence of prisons).
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(or legal) purposes and violence used for unjust (or illegal) purposes.
Violence authorized by law is just(ified), and violence outside the law is
not.13 Legal theorist Robert Cover articulates this understanding of law
as an alternative to and a means to control violence: “Were the
inhibition against violence perfect, law would be unnecessary; were it
not capable of being overcome through social signals, law would not be
possible.”14 Here, law represents the best intentions: it “is the
projection of an imagined future upon reality.”15
Judges and lawyers, though not its only agents, are often the most
visible faces of the law, particularly in this model. The traditional,
idealized view of judges (and sometimes lawyers) focuses on esteemed
qualities of intelligence and ethics, but also on an objectivity and “ability
to step away from the battles of the day and to articulate the principles of
a rational and orderly society.”16 They seem to be the antithesis of
violence, and yet judges also wield violence through their ability to
command the enforcement of the law.17 If, as former federal court judge
Patricia Wald suggests, “a society is defined by its ability to enforce
communal decisions—by force, if necessary,” then it is left to the judge
to “affirmatively sanction yet try to control and channel that violence to
attain the law’s ends.”18 Cover and Wald both use the criminal trial and
the role of the judge to illustrate the conventional view of the
relationship of law and violence: the defendant’s violence is outside the
law and is met with law’s tempered violence through the judgment for
punishment, even to the extreme case of the death penalty.19 In this
context (and perhaps more broadly) legal interpretations serve to justify
violence exercised by the state.20 These are “organized, social practices
of violence” where the interpretation of what ought to be done is

13. This view of the connection between law and violence is reflected in essays by prominent
legal theorist Robert Cover and former federal court judge Patricia Wald. COVER, supra note 12, at
203-38; Wald, supra note 1, at 77-104.
14. COVER, supra note 12, at 219.
15. Id. at 207. This is not to suggest that Cover’s view lacks nuance; he is mindful of the role
of ideology in law and of the unequal power relations at play. Id. at 212.
16. Wald, supra note 1, at 77.
17. Id. at 78. Wald characterizes this as “liv[ing] in paradoxical proximity to violence.” Id.
18. Id.
19. COVER, supra note 12, at 224-36; Wald, supra note 1, at 78-88. Wald gives other
examples in a civil law context, such as domestic violence (where the law’s violence can be a
resource for victims) or the right to peaceful protest (where law must face the risk of violent
responses to the protest). Id. at 92-100.
20. COVER, supra note 12, at 203.
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separated out from the act of doing the violence.21 Judges, then, are both
linked to and separated from law’s violence.22
Punishment is, then, a central feature of law as it strives to provide
justice; the simple logic of the system states that if you break the law
(and if you get caught), you will be punished. Equally important,
however, is the sense that law’s consequences are punishment rather
than vengeance. It is common, particularly among those within the legal
system, to view the law as objective, rational, and impartial, rather than
emotional, subjective, and biased.23 Underlying this view of the law is a
sense that the move to rationalize punishment represents a sort of
forward progress in the law, a channeling of violence into impartial
bureaucracies or the hands of various experts to become discipline and
punishment.24 Social theorists have problematized this view.25 They
have suggested instead that the nature and type of legal institutions have

21. Id. at 203, 235. Derrida points out, however, that interpretation itself may be “a juridicosymbolic violence, a performative violence.” Derrida, supra note 4, at 995.
22. Cover suggests that judges may use their violent power by withholding it: “A judge may
or may not be able to change the deeds of official violence, but she may always withhold the
justification for this violence.” COVER, supra note 12, at 228-29 n.48. Although judges are
distanced from the outcome of their decisions, Wald contends that judges must work to “retain the
humanizing sense of accountability for imposing law’s violence on individual defendants.” Wald,
supra note 1, at 83.
23. See infra Part III for a discussion of law as bureaucracy.
24. . In Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison, Foucault also considers the role of the
judge but finds it less ennobling and expansive than either Cover or Wald. In his view, the role of
the judge is transformed by the move to disciplinary power. In that framework, the police assume a
more dominant role; judges become “the scarcely resisting employees of this apparatus.”
FOUCAULT, supra note 12, at 282. Instead of the courts, the prison, and more broadly the carceral,
becomes the “model of justice itself.” Id. at 302. Foucault suggests that “[t]he carceral ‘naturalizes’
the legal power to punish, as it ‘legalizes’ the technical power to discipline.” Id. at 303.
Disciplinary power is “a type of power that the law validates and that justice uses as its favourite
weapon.” Id. at 302. It operates by giving “the power to inflict legal punishment a context in which
it appears to be free of all excess and all violence.” Id. In a sense, this is the separation between
interpretation and violence that both Cover and Wald also describe.
25. Durkheim suggests two “laws” that explain quantitative and qualitative variations in
punishment over time. EMILE DURKHEIM, Two Laws of Penal Evolution, in EMILE DURKHEIM ON
INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS 153, 153-79 (Mark Traugott ed. & trans., The Univ. of Chicago Press
1978) (1900). Tracing the historical changes in punishment practices from torture and public
executions to imprisonment outside of public view, he articulates his first “law”: “The intensity of
punishment is greater as societies belong to a less advanced type . . . and as centralized power has a
more absolute power.” Id. at 153. This linkage of quantitative variations to macro considerations
such as the type of society and the centralization of power follows the traditional view of “progress”
in addressing crime in a society. His second “law” folds in micro concerns of duration and intensity
of the crime as influenced by increasing societal development: “Punishments consisting in privation
of freedom—and freedom alone—for lengths of time varying according to the gravity of the crime,
tend more and more to become the normal type of repression.” Id. at 164.
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changed over time as the means of exercising power have also
transformed.26
Punishment under sovereign reign, centered on public execution,
was understood as the vengeance of the sovereign.27 This common form
of punishment was “more than an act of justice; it was a manifestation of
force; or rather, it was justice as the physical, material and awesome
force of the sovereign deployed there.”28 Over time, however,
subsequent penal reform shifted from the idea of vengeance to the idea
of defending society.29 Foucault describes this as the transformation of
sovereign power to disciplinary power, and this transformation also
reworks the legal system.30 The police and other non-judicial actors
assume a more dominant role in the legal system, and this transformation
results in a new form of law—“a mixture of legality and nature,
prescriptions and constitution, the norm.”31 The power to punish
extends beyond the sovereign to include the wide range of actors that are
familiar today: the police, the courts, the lawyers, the probation officers,
the social workers, the prison guards, and so forth.
In this new framework, the relations of power multiply, and this is a
point that is easy to overlook in conventional views of law. The
violence of the law—even of legal interpretation and practices of
punishment—does not occur on an equal playing field; law’s violence is
implicated in relations of power, where “perpetrator and victim of
organized violence will undergo achingly disparate significant

26. Durkheim concludes: “If penal law is milder today than heretofore, it is not because the
ancient institutions of criminal justice remained the same, little by little losing their rigor; rather, it
is because they have been replaced by different institutions.” Id. at 179. Here, he accounts for the
evolution by investigating “what gave birth to the prison in its original form and then what led to its
later transformations.” Id. at 166. In many respects, Durkheim lays a foundation for Foucault’s
later investigations in Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison. FOUCAULT, supra note 12.
Foucault’s work in this text precedes and foreshadows his later work on governmentality as he
traces the exercise of punishment from sovereign society to disciplinary society. See infra Part IV.
27. FOUCAULT, supra note 12 at 90.
28. Id. at 50.
29. Id. at 90.
30. Within the legal system, there is increasing use of the “simple instruments” of
“hierarchical observation, normalizing judgement and their combination in a procedure that is
specific to it, the examination.” Id. at 170.
31. Id. at 304. Foucault suggests:
Beneath the increasing leniency of punishment, then, one may map a displacement of its point of
application; and through this displacement, a whole field of recent objects, a whole new system of
truth and a mass of roles hitherto unknown in the exercise of criminal justice. A corpus of
knowledge, techniques, ‘scientific’ discourses is formed and becomes entangled with the practice of
the power to punish.
Id. at 22-23.
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experiences.”32 Even the conventional view recognizes that the ideology
of law as a civilizer of violence “is much more significant in justifying
an order to those who principally benefit from it and who must defend it
than it is in hiding the nature of the order from those who are its
victims.”33 Simply put, the judge is more likely to believe that the legal
system tempers violence than the defendant and his or her community
(and, likely, the crime victims). This recognition, however, is ultimately
reconciled in, or obscured by, the belief that law serves to domesticate
violence, that those with power in the system can use their power (and
the law) for benign purposes, to restrain other, non-authorized forms of
violence.34 This view results in a focus on institutions as dominant—and
identifying—features of law, and it also lead to questions about
international law’s status as law when it appears to lack these features.
How can international law be law without the means to enforce, to
punish, to meet unauthorized violence with authorized violence?
Alternative views of law as violence offer insight on this fundamental
question.
B.

Law as Enmeshed with Violence

Although conventional theories of law as a substitute for or
opposition to violence are useful ways of thinking about the nature of
law and law’s work, there are also more critical views of law’s
relationship to violence, which see the two as deeply enmeshed.35 These
perspectives shift the focus from law’s use of violence to violence as a
feature of law. In a foundational essay, “Critique of Violence,” Walter
Benjamin examines violence through its relationship to law and justice.36
His focus is on violence itself as a means, without concern for the
32. COVER, supra note 12, at 238.
33. Id. at 212. Foucault also identifies this point: “[t]he general juridical form that
guaranteed a system of rights that were egalitarian in principle was supported by these tiny,
everyday, physical mechanisms, by all those systems of micro-power that are essentially nonegalitarian and asymmetrical that we call the disciplines.” FOUCAULT, supra note 12, at 222.
34. COVER, supra note 12, at 236. In judge-like fashion, Wald prescribes: “The law’s
violence must be rationed fairly and not denied to some individuals who need its protection.” Wald,
supra note 1, at 103. In his essay on Cover, Austin Sarat problematizes this view. Whereas Cover
“reluctantly preferred” law’s violence, Sarat asks what “price is paid for law’s intimacy with
violence.” Austin Sarat, Robert Cover on Law and Violence, in NARRATIVE, VIOLENCE, AND THE
LAW: THE ESSAYS OF ROBERT COVER, supra note 12, at 261. Sarat notes that violence “puts an
end to interpretation and meaning construction,” and as a result law’s violence is “a continuous
threat to law’s principal involvement in the production and maintenance of meaning in diverse
normative communities.” Id. at 257.
35. BENJAMIN, supra note 4, at 277-300; Derrida, supra note 4, at 919-1045.
36. BENJAMIN, supra note 4, at 277-300.
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particular ends towards which it is directed (just or unjust, for
example).37 He identifies two forms of violence as means—law-making
violence and law-preserving violence.38 Law-making violence is an
originating violence, the violence that establishes law, and lawpreserving violence is a maintaining violence, which sustains law’s
power (though these distinctions ultimately break down).39
Benjamin argues that in the quest to find the original source of
legitimacy for law, one must end up with—or rather begin with—
violence.40 In a basic sense, law-making violence is about power as it
establishes the new order.41 Law’s oft-noted interest in a holding a
monopoly on violence is a law-preserving violence, concerned with
maintaining power, because “violence, when not in the hands of the law,
threatens it not by the ends that it may pursue but by its mere existence
outside the law.”42 As a result, “all violence as a means . . . is implicated
in the problematic nature of law itself.”43 This illuminates an essential
role for violence in law. Violence is enmeshed with law; it is present in
the foundational moment of law and also serves to preserve law and the
legal order. In some sense, Benjamin’s idea of law-preserving violence
supplements the conventional view as much as it challenges it; it
grounds law in violence rather than in opposition to it, and it expands
law’s use of violence to the preservation of itself.
Other theorists have both critiqued and extended this view of law’s
intimacy with violence.44 Jacques Derrida begins his inquiry with a
revealing point of language regarding the common expression of “the
force of law.”45 He emphasizes that “there is no law without
enforceability, and no applicability or enforceability of the law without

37. Benjamin sets aside the conventional understandings of natural law and positive law,
which both feature in contemporary human rights law and practice, and which evaluate violence
either through its connection to just ends or through its use of legal means. Id. at 277.
38. Id. at 287.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 295.
41. Id.
42. BENJAMIN, supra note 4, at 281. Like the conventional theorists, Benjamin also draws
upon the example of the death penalty. However, Benjamin suggests that “in the exercise of
violence over life and death more than in any other legal act, law reaffirms itself.” Id. at 286.
43. Id. at 287.
44. Derrida, supra note 4, at 919-1045.
45. Derrida points out that “law is always an authorized force, a force that justifies itself or is
justified in applying itself, even if this justification may be judged from elsewhere to be unjust or
unjustifiable.” Id. at 925. Derrida also engages directly with Benjamin’s Critique of Violence,
noting that violence for Benjamin includes “both violence and legitimate power, justified authority.”
Id. at 927.

http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol44/iss2/1

10

Bruch: Is International Law Really Law?

6_BRUCH_WESTERN 2.18.11.DOCM

2011]

IS INTERNATIONAL LAW REALLY LAW?

2/22/2011 2:08 PM

343

force.”46 The relationship of force or violence to law is a complex one,
particularly when one considers the emergence of law (and even justice);
law itself emerges from violence that is not yet legal or authorized (nor
illegal or unauthorized) in the founding moment.47 However, law and
violence are entwined even beyond this originating moment. Law
“claims to exercise itself in the name of justice and that justice is
required to establish itself in the name of a law that must be
‘enforced.’”48
Law-preserving violence and law-making violence are in a
dialectical relationship.49 Derrida suggests that founding law and
conserving law eventually collapse into one another.50 This becomes
evident—and particularly relevant to the context of international law—in
examining the origin of the state. Derrida suggests, “The foundation of
all states occurs in a situation that we can thus call revolutionary. It
inaugurates a new law; it always does so in violence.”51 Law-making
violence is the revolutionary moment, the creation of a new state and a
new law; in fact, it is an exceptional moment, even “an instance of nonlaw” as it exists outside the law. 52 Law-preserving violence seeks to
conserve that new state and new law, and this may often be the
conventional, and more familiar, violence of law that seeks to punish
threats to the existing legal and social order. However, there is always a
contradiction in that the founding violence can be repeated and a new
law established.53

46. Id. at 926-27. Derrida takes an expansive view of force, which may be “direct or indirect,
physical or symbolic, exterior or interior, brutal or subtly discursive and hermeneutic, coercive or
regulative, and so forth.” Id. at 927.
47. Id. at 943. Derrida provides a foundation for connecting it to the international realm by
linking it to the origin of the state. Id. at 1007.
48. Id. at 959, 961. Derrida explains: “Justice, as law, is never exercised without a decision
that cuts, that divides,” and in its violence, law “claims to recognize and defend said humanity as
end, in the person of each individual.” Id. at 963, 1003.
49. BENJAMIN, supra note 4, at 300. In fact, Benjamin contends that “[w]hen the
consciousness of [the latent pretence of] violence in a legal institution disappears, the institution
falls into decay.” Id. at 288.
50. Derrida contends that law “is both threatening and threatened by itself.” Derrida, supra
note 4, at 1003. Thus, it begins the process of decay identified by Benjamin, “the trajectory of
decline, of institutional ‘degeneracy.’” Id. at 1015.
51. Id. at 991.
52. Id. Derrida also contextualizes Benjamin’s essay as reflecting “the crisis in the European
model of bourgeois, liberal, parliamentary democracy, and so the crisis in the concept of droit that is
inseparable from it.” Interestingly, his own context is 1989-1990 at a different time of upheaval
with the collapse of the Soviet Union and the emergence of new nations out of the former Soviet
bloc. Id. at 979.
53. Derrida calls this the “paradox of iterability.” Id. at 1007.
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This more complicated view of law’s violence, particularly in
exceptional moments, has been elaborated further in Giorgio Agamben’s
work.54 Here, the focus is not on the founding moment of law, but rather
on an instance of non-law; he looks to the “state of exception,” where
the law is suspended, to reveal law’s violence.55 Agamben asks what
happens to law when the law is not erased or replaced but is deactivated
and inactive.56 Because the state of exception appears to be both inside
and outside the juridical order, it illuminates both the presence of law
and the absence of law, the efficacy of law and the force of law.57 The
state of exception essentially separates the force of law (its “formal
essence”) from the law itself.58 It is “the opening of a space” where “in
order to apply a norm it is ultimately necessary to suspend its
application, to produce an exception.”59
In this context, there are real dangers to the juridical order and
beyond.60 Agamben discusses these risks when a domestic sovereign
suspends law in the name of emergency, but something very similar
happens in international intervention. Domestic law is suspended or
overtaken in response to conflict or crisis; although a new legal
framework is ultimately (re)instated, international authority often
governs in the interim and in the name of the law but without
meaningful legal constraint. Despite the grim possibilities in these
exceptional moments, however, there may also be opportunity in the
deactivation of the law. To explore the possibilities of the open space of
54. GIORGIO AGAMBEN, STATE OF EXCEPTION (Kevin Attell trans., 2005). Like Derrida,
Agamben engages directly with Benjamin’s earlier work on violence and law, examining the debate
between Benjamin and Carl Schmitt; at issue in their debate “is the relation between violence and
law—in the last analysis, the status of violence as a cipher for human action” in the zone of anomie
that is the state of exception. Id. at 59.
55. The state of exception “is a suspension of the juridical order itself, it defines law’s
threshold or limit concept.” Id. at 4.
56. Id. at 64. Agamben traces the history of the state of exception in the European and
American contexts from World War I forward, illustrating its gradual progression from exception to
rule. In many ways, the state of exception is grounded in, but distinct from, the idea of necessity,
which has its own complex relationship to law. Id. at 24-28. Agamben also notes that the state of
exception appears related to dictatorship although he cautions that it is “not a dictatorship . . . but a
space devoid of law.” Id. at 50.
57. Id. at 37.
58. Id. at 38.
59. Id. at 40. Agamben also characterizes it as “an emptiness and standstill of the law.” Id. at
48.
60. This is particularly the case when the state of exception results in power and authority
combined in one person: “The normative aspect of law can thus be obliterated and contradicted
with impunity by a governmental violence that—while ignoring international law externally and
producing a permanent state of exception internally—nevertheless still claims to be applying the
law.” AGAMBEN, supra note 54, at 87.
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the state of exception requires severing the connection between law and
violence and beginning to re-imagine the possible uses of law
disconnected from violence.61 Or, more simply, it may just require
beginning to ask what “price is paid for law’s intimacy with violence.”62
This foundational question is one that critical theorists have engaged
with and begun to explore through a deeper examination of the ways in
which law and violence are enmeshed.
Although international
intervention aspires to restore law disconnected from violence, it seldom
asks the more important questions about how law and violence are
enmeshed and what costs that may exact.
C.

Law and Violence in Humanitarian Intervention

Although domestic examples of criminal law, as well as more
exceptional moments of revolution and emergency, are typically used by
theorists to illuminate law’s violence and the collapse of law-making and
law-preserving violence into one another, humanitarian intervention
provides an equally compelling example of law’s violence in the
international realm. However, the analysis and critique of humanitarian
intervention, human rights, and human rights law has typically focused
on its bureaucratic and governmentalizing tendencies.63 The role of
violence has seldom been discussed, usually for one of two primary
reasons. The first is grounded in international law’s crisis of identity—is
it really law at all?64 As suggested by conventional views of law and
violence, the most frequent reason that is given to undermine
international law’s status as law is that, simplistically put, there is no
international judiciary, police force or even military to enforce it;
international law is fundamentally a consent-based regime.65
Particularly in the area of human rights, advocates are left to rely on
61.
62.
63.
64.

Id. at 88.
Sarat, supra note 34, at 261.
See infra Parts III and IV.
See ORFORD, supra note 3, at 72. But see JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE
LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2005) (setting forth a rational choice theory of international law).
65. Although private international law, in areas such as business and trade, can find analogies
to contract and other domestic private law as a basis for efficacy and look to the “market” for
enforcement, public international law struggles in the absence of an international sovereign or
government. See ORFORD, supra note 3, at 72-73; GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 64, at 3. See
also Thomas C. Heller & Abraham D. Sofaer, Sovereignty, The Practitioners’ Perspective, in
PROBLEMATIC SOVEREIGNTY: CONTESTED RULES AND POLITICAL POSSIBILITIES 31-33 (Stephen D.
Krasner ed., 2001) (describing these international commitments as the exercise of sovereignty,
rather than limitations upon sovereignty); Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International
Law?, 106 YALE L.J. 2599, 2645-46 (1997) (discussing the theory that internalized compliance and
obedience increase comportment with international law).
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strategies of persuasion and shame to ensure compliance.66 Because
international law is often viewed as lacking in enforceability—necessary
force—the absence of force or violence has typically been bemoaned
and brushed aside.67
Nonetheless, at present, a massive international institutional
structure—in the United Nations and its subsidiary agencies and regional
counter-parts, including many international tribunals (such as the
International Criminal Court, the ad hoc war crimes tribunals, the
International Court of Justice, and so on)—exists that focuses on
implementation, if not enforcement, of international law. Moreover,
although there is not a single, unified international police or military,
there are numerous alliances and instances of cooperative policing and
use of force (Interpol, NATO, and the various military coalitions
“authorized” to act by the United Nations Security Council) aimed at
similar ends. Therefore, the second and somewhat contradictory reason
that law’s violence has not been commonly examined in international
law is that the force that initiates and supports humanitarian intervention
is viewed in isolation and justified as well-intentioned and necessary to
avoid a greater violence.68 The question of violence then sidestepped or
compartmentalized, the analysis turns to the work of capacity- or nationbuilding and the establishment of the “rule of law.” This somewhat
contradictory status of international law serves as both incentive and
justification for ignoring the role of violence or force in human rights
law and practice. It may be largely overlooked, of course, but that does
not mean it is absent.
Drawing upon the conventional and critical theories of law and
violence discussed above, the force that supports international
intervention can be problematized at both the micro level of the legal
(and other) institutions at work during and after intervention and at the
macro level of the geo-political dynamics of the intervention itself. The
conventional view of law as a civilizer of or restraint upon violence is
one that would likely be embraced by many human rights practitioners
and advocates of humanitarian intervention.69 At the micro level, this
66. Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks, How to Influence States: Socialization and International
Human Rights Law, 54 DUKE L.J. 621 (2004). Goodman and Jinks discuss mechanisms of coercion,
persuasion, and acculturation.
67. Id. at 633-38 (discussing coercion and persuasion).
68. See MARCHAK, supra note 8; RAZACK, supra note 9; KENNEDY, supra note 10.
69. See HUMAN RIGHTS FIELD OPERATIONS, LAW, THEORY AND PRACTICE, supra note 9;
CHARLESWORTH & CHINKIN, supra note 8, at 268-69; Sally Engle Merry, Introduction to Part One:
States of Violence, in THE PRACTICE OF HUMAN RIGHTS: TRACKING LAW BETWEEN THE GLOBAL
AND LOCAL 41, 41-48 (Mark Goodale & Sally Engle Merry eds., 2007).
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view underpins the many international or quasi-international institutions
that are modeled on domestic institutions, such as the numerous
international tribunals that adjudicate individual responsibility for
international crimes or monitor human rights treaty compliance.70 The
domestic criminal trial has its counterpart in the war crimes cases before
the International Criminal Court and the other ad hoc international war
crimes tribunals, and domestic civil examples find their counterparts in
more quotidian cases of human rights violations heard by treatymonitoring tribunals.71 Although there may be some recognition of the
power disparities in these processes, they are reconciled with law’s role
as domesticator of violence. This view simultaneously acknowledges
the violence of law and yet also justifies it; law’s violence, if not exactly
benign, operates for the greater good.72
The conventional view of law as domesticator of violence, in fact
as both civilizer and evidence of civilization, is also relevant at the
macro level. Historically, it has served as a rationale in support of the
extensive and aggressive interventions of colonialism.73 Early colonial
endeavors were often justified by a perceived absence of law and a

70. See, e.g., Etelle R. Higonnet, Restructuring Hybrid Courts: Local Empowerment and
National Criminal Justice Reform, 23 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 347 (2006) (assessing advantages
and disadvantages of hybrid criminal tribunals and contrasting them to ad hoc tribunals such as the
ICTY and ICTR); Patricia M. Wald, International Criminal Tribunals in the 21st Century: Iraq,
Cambodia, and International Justice, 21 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 541 (2006) (discussing war crimes
tribunals in Iraq and Cambodia); Laura A. Dickinson, Transitional Justice in Afghanistan: The
Promise of Mixed Tribunals, 31 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 23 (2002) (discussing tribunals in
Kosovo and East Timor); Michael Lieberman, Salvaging the Remains: The Khmer Rouge Tribunal
on Trial, 186 MIL. L. REV. 164 (2005) (discussing proposed tribunal for Cambodia).
71. Interestingly, law’s reach is often more extensive in those contexts, where the
responsibility of the state (or its subsidiary organs) is at issue, rather than the responsibility of an
individual defendant. See Elizabeth M. Bruch, Hybrid Courts: Examining Hybridity Through a
Post-Colonial Lens, 28 B.U. INT’L L.J. 1 (2010); Timothy Cornell & Lance Salisbury, The
Importance of Civil Law in the Transition to Peace: Lessons from the Human Rights Chamber for
Bosnia and Herzegovina, 35 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 389 (2002); Wald, supra note 1, at 88-103
(describing law’s violence in the civil context of domestic law). In fact, Patricia Wald offers a good
illustration of the reach of the conventional view beyond the domestic level and into the
international level, given her status as first a U.S. federal judge and then later as a judge on the
International Criminal Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia.
72. See supra Part II.A.
73. Gil Gott uses historical analysis of colonial regimes in an effort at a “critical
historicization of the modern human rights project.” Gil Gott, Imperial Humanitarianism: History
of an Arrested Dialectic, in MORAL IMPERIALISM: A CRITICAL ANTHOLOGY 19, 19 (Berta
Esperanza Hernández-Truyol ed., 2002). He shows that “humanitarian discourse did more than
provide cover for the raw power ambitions of the imperial states . . . [it] formed a kind of partially
arrested dialectic, whereby the transnational humanitarian identity became an important articulation
point of imperialism.” Id. at 30. He suggests that a critical human rights project must recognize and
“break with received forms of humanitarianism.” Id. at 35.
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prevalence of (uncivilized, barbaric) violence among the colonized.74
Law was brought to the uncivilized through the overt violence of
forceful occupation as well as through the indirect violence of the
importation of a new legal framework. Far from being a relic of the
past, however, this “discourse of ‘the West and the Rest’ is alive and
well in the modern world” as it echoes through current humanitarian
interventions.75 At times, such as in Rwanda or Haiti, the imperial
legacy that supports the contemporary intervention is direct and obvious;
in other situations, such as Bosnia and Kosovo, it may be a more indirect
legacy of form and structure.76 As in earlier imperial endeavors, a
central theme that underlies the rationale for such intervention is the
“absence of law, including international law, and a lack of sustained
engagement by international organizations” in areas of crisis.77 In this
context, law’s violence reemerges as the texts of international law—the
UN Charter, human rights treaties, Security Council Resolutions—
“authorize particular violent acts as legitimate” when supported by
humanitarian rationales.78
Although such humanitarian endeavors linked with force are not
new, they are increasingly common (and controversial) at the
international level.
Even in the contemporary era, debates about humanitarian
intervention reflect both conventional and critical views of law in
relation to violence. For example, the idea of a “responsibility to
protect” has increasingly gained prominence at the international level.79
This doctrine suggests that “where a population is suffering serious
harm, as a result of internal war, insurgency, repression or state failure,
and the state in question is unwilling or unable to halt or avert it, the
74. Stuart Hall explains that early European explorers “were immediately struck by what they
interpreted as the absence of government and civil society—the basis of all ‘civilization’—among
peoples of the New World.” Stuart Hall, The West and the Rest: Discourse and Power, in
FORMATIONS OF MODERNITY 275, 303 (Stuart Hall & Bram Gieben eds., 1992). Later imperial
efforts reflected the same views, influenced in part by early sociological thinkers. Id. at 314-15.
75. Id. at 318. See Gott, supra note 73, at 19-38; RAZACK, supra note 9.
76. In each of these examples, however, the “international community” takes on the imperial
role, forcefully intervening for the sake of establishing the rule of law; this rule of law replaces,
domesticates and redeploys violence for its own ends. Orford characterizes collective humanitarian
intervention as a “willingness to use force in the name of humanitarian values.” ORFORD, supra
note 3, at 2. See RAZACK, supra note 9, at 165; Bruch, supra note 71.
77. ORFORD, supra note 3, at 15.
78. Id. at 50.
79. See INT’L COMM’N ON INTERVENTION AND STATE SOVEREIGNTY, THE RESPONSIBILITY
TO PROTECT: REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON INTERVENTION AND STATE
SOVEREIGNTY (2001); MARCHAK, supra note 8. See also SPENCER ZIFCAK, UNITED NATIONS
REFORM: HEADING NORTH OR SOUTH? (2009).
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principle of non-intervention yields to the international responsibility to
protect.”80 In many ways, it reflects the influence of the discourse of
“the West and the Rest” and its dialectical impulses towards violence
and governance.81 It is based on a belief in a disinterested, Western
humanitarian impulse to establish the “rule of law” with little
recognition of Western self-interest in intervention (or even complicity
in the situations of conflict or transition that serve to justify
intervention).82 Moreover, there is the “paradox of humanitarian goals
accomplished by force,” which is often legitimated by the language of
human rights.83 The narratives of these interventions reveal “deeply
internalized myths about our civilizing mission” in the West (or, now,
the Global North).84 Law, in this context, serves to distract from the
violence of the intervention and restore a sense of innocence in both
intention and action.85 In fact, originating violence becomes justified
through “the narrative of choice”—where nations (again, usually of the
West or Global North) must either stand by as atrocities occur or
intervene militarily to establish a new legal order.86 It is a new
revolutionary or exceptional moment. Framed as choice, “[v]iolence

80. See INT’L COMM’N ON INTERVENTION AND STATE SOVEREIGNTY, supra note 79;
MARCHAK, supra note 8, at 6.
81. See INT’L COMM’N ON INTERVENTION AND STATE SOVEREIGNTY, supra note 79;
MARCHAK, supra note 8. Marchak takes a generally supportive view of humanitarian intervention,
broadly defined to include both military and non-military interventions. Through case studies of
interventions in the “broken societies” of Cambodia, Rwanda, and Bosnia, Marchak illustrates the
complexities of humanitarian (or other) engagement in real contexts. Id. at 97. However, the focus
is on practical failures of these endeavors, rather than broader theoretical concerns about their
connections to earlier colonial enterprises and Cold War interventions or problematizing notions
such as the emerging doctrine of a “responsibility to protect.” Id. at 37. Marchak concludes that
“success for humanitarian interventionist strategies is dependent on knowing who the combatants
are, knowing why they are in conflict, and having an articulated and publicly understood yet
disinterested objective.” Id. at 287. Without these conditions, “interventions under present world
circumstances should be avoided unless both or all combatants request it.” Id.
82. But see MARCHAK, supra note 8, at 290-91. Marchak states, “While external powers
attempt to influence broken societies by introducing Western legal systems and courts, the one thing
still missing is their acknowledgement of their own culpability for some of these happenings.”
83. RAZACK, supra note 9, at 40, 44. Razack focuses on legal proceedings that followed
incidents of violence by Canadian peacekeepers against Somali civilians, noting that “[l]aw has an
important role to play . . . for it is in the courtroom and at hearings that a public truth is proclaimed
about who we are as a people and as a nation.” Id. at 8.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 149. Although Razack’s focus is on Somalia, she also considers peacekeeping and
peace enforcement missions in Bosnia, Haiti, and elsewhere; she concludes that “[n]o peacekeeping
mission involving Western peacekeepers seems to have been without violence directed at the local
population.” Id. at 53.
86. Id. at 150.
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helps establish who is, in fact, in control.”87 However, it remains a selfdenying violence that justifies and thereby renders invisible the force
exercised in the name of humanity.
Humanitarian intervention and the international law that is
deployed in its support, thus, operate with law’s violence along similar
paths as the domestic law considered by both conventional and critical
theorists. From the early history of colonialism to contemporary
projects of international intervention, it is possible to trace that violence.
Like revolution, humanitarian intervention establishes a new law and,
often, a new state out of violence. It is a forceful violence that
intervenes militarily to establish and to preserve a new legal order. It
enforces the rule of law at both the national and the international level.
Although the originating violence in this context is typically cloaked in
legality (or, at least, justice), it is a contested rather than a stable legality.
It is an interpretive violence that recognizes only certain forms of law as
law and that remakes existing regimes in its image. This interpretive
violence supports both the decision to intervene and the subsequent
practices of the institutions that operate the new legal regime. It also
legitimates itself in the new law—international human rights law or,
more broadly, the “rule of law”—that it establishes. Yet, the new legal
order remains vulnerable, perhaps more obviously so than more
established states; there is always the threat of a new revolutionary
moment that will destroy the existing legal order and install yet another
new order. This threat exists for both the new national legal order and
the international legal order.
This, then, justifies continuing
international involvement, even force, to (re)establish the rule of law.
International law, like domestic law, is co-implicated with violence.
III. THE RULE(S) OF LAW: BUREAUCRACY AND EXPERTISE IN PROJECTS
OF HUMAN RIGHTS
In contrast to violence, the connections between law and
bureaucracy are more readily apparent as fundamental features of the
state and domestic legal system as well as the international legal domain.
Law’s quest for objectivity and rationality underscore the importance of
bureaucracy, from the massive administrative apparatus of the “justice”
system to the extensive and wide-ranging codification of legal doctrine.
These features are evident not just in the practices of law, but also in the
work of individuals and institutions, the various experts in law and
87. Id. at 156. However, seeing the choice “as starkly as a choice between going and not
going is again to remain within the moral universe of imperialism.” Id. at 164-65.
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otherwise, that participate in its processes. This section will elaborate
the development and proliferation of law’s bureaucracies and will
consider the role of expertise in that context. It will then examine the
ways in which this bureaucratic dimension of law manifests itself in
humanitarian interventions and the human rights legal regimes they
establish.
A.

Bureaucracy and Law

Social theorists have long considered the links between law and
bureaucracy. Early sociologist (and trained lawyer) Max Weber shows
how bureaucracy operates in the administration of justice, through the
development of “rational” legal procedures and formalized legal
concepts.88 Like the theorists of violence and law, Weber was interested
in the origination of law and its subsequent legitimacy.89 In his view, a
simple norm or rule became law if it was enforced by “psychological or
physical coercion by a staff of people.”90 Thus, a sense of force
underlies his understanding of law, and both force and bureaucracy are
present in his definition of the state. For Weber, the state is a
“compulsory political organization with continuous operations . . .
insofar as its administrative staff successfully upholds the claim to the
monopoly of the legitimate use of force.”91 While force may be
foundational, however, law’s process itself is rational and bureaucratic.
In fact, in Weber’s view, the modern state is “completely dependent
on bureaucracy,” and the longer the process of bureaucratization goes

88. WEBER, The Development of Bureaucracy and its Relation to Law, in MAX WEBER:
SELECTIONS IN TRANSLATION, supra note 4, at 352.
89. See TURNER & FACTOR, supra note 4. Weber considered systems of law and convention
as “orders” included within “uniformities of action.” Id. at 82. Legitimacy and beliefs about
legitimacy, in contrast to questions of validity, are essential in this context. Id. at 101. Weber
distinguishes between convention and law by the consequences that result from deviation. If
deviation results in disapproval by the social group, it is a convention; if it results in “psychological
or physical coercion by a staff of people,” it is law. Id. at 102.
90. Id. Law’s origins, however, are not in violence nor in rationality, but rather in something
outside of both. This is because of an “inherent limitation” in rationalization, which is that the end
goals themselves cannot be rationalized. Id. at 176. Although “Weber understood the process of
‘positivization’ of the law as an adjunct to the historical process of rationalization, or rather as a
form of this process,” he nonetheless concluded that “[w]hat positivism inadvertently produces is a
concept of the law that can be grounded only in a kind of ‘faith.’” Id. at 172-73.
91. Id. at 104. However, as Turner and Factor note, “Weber argues that legitimacy and the
state evolve separately . . . legitimacy does not evolve . . . out of force.” Id. at 108. Instead, Weber
concluded that law emerged by revelation, and that legal formalism reflects “in some sense a
residue of the magical element in primitive law.” Id. at 109.
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on, the further it extends.92 This increasing bureaucratization is caused
by the intensification of demands on administration as societies become
increasingly complex.93 This complexity encompasses increased social
responsibilities, modern forms of interaction and communication, and
political sophistication.94 In terms of political factors, the most
significant is the social demand for stability, order, and protection.95
Thus, bureaucracy is an instrument and feature of law and order; it offers
its unique attributes of “[p]recision, dispatch, clarity, familiarity with the
documents, continuity, discretion, uniformity” and reduced material and
personal costs.96 However, there are other costs to a bureaucratic
system—such systems are inflexible, rigidly hierarchical, almost
mechanized.97 The administrators and officials are dehumanized, in a
sense, as the professional and objective office is separated from private
life and subjective sensibilities.98 At the same time, other participants
are also dehumanized as bureaucratic practice focuses on general rules
and disregards individual, particular situations.99
Along with the rise of the legal bureaucracy comes the increasing
rationalization of the law and legal system.100 In both civil and common
law systems, “[t]ypification, one-sided selectivity, idealization
(especially in the context of instruction), rationalization, and
codification” become central to processes of developing and applying
the law.101 These same practices remain central to the law in
contemporary settings. In fact, this leads to a common conception of the
law as “scientific” or “objective.”102 Law and science both appear to

92. WEBER, The Development of Bureaucracy and its Relation to Law, in MAX WEBER:
SELECTIONS IN TRANSLATION, supra note 4, at 347. He continues: “the bureaucratisation is all the
more complete the bigger the state is, and above all, the more it is or becomes a great power.” Id.
93. Id. at 348.
94. Id. at 349.
95. Weber characterizes this as “the increasing need felt by a society grown accustomed to
stable and absolute peace for order and protection (‘police’) in all areas.” Id.
96. Id. at 350.
97. Id. at 344-45.
98. WEBER, The Development of Bureaucracy and its Relation to Law, in MAX WEBER:
SELECTIONS IN TRANSLATION, supra note 4, at 344-45.
99. Id. at 351.
100. Weber’s work on law, perhaps reflecting his training and practice as a lawyer before he
turned to sociology, also emphasizes the rationalization of law. In Max Weber: The Lawyer as
Social Thinker, Stephen Turner and Regis Factor trace Weber’s personal transformation and his
theoretical transformation of legal science into his sociology. TURNER & FACTOR, supra note 4.
101. Id. at 140.
102. Bruno Latour, Scientific Objects and Legal Objectivity, in LAW, ANTHROPOLOGY AND
THE CONSTITUTION OF THE SOCIAL: MAKING PERSONS AND THINGS 73, 73-114 (Alain Pottage &
Martha Mundy eds., 2004).
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“emphasise the virtues of a disinterested and unprejudiced approach,
based on distance and precision.”103 Nonetheless, there remain
important distinctions as well; law’s quest for “objectivity” centers on
the sort of indifference and distance characteristic of bureaucracy.104
Again, the role of the judge provides illustration. Judges hold an
important place in the legal hierarchy and exercise their power through
interpretation and judgment.105 Under their guidance, the system
“appears to partake both of the positive logic of science and the
normative logic of morality and thus to be capable of compelling
universal acceptance through an inevitability which is simultaneously
logical and ethical.”106 The rationalization of the legal process provides
judicial decision-making with its effectiveness by “granting the status of
judgment to a legal decision which no doubt owes more to the ethical
dispositions of the actors than to the pure norms of the law.”107 Law

103. Id. at 73. Latour continues: “in both domains participants speak esoteric languages and
reason in carefully cultivated styles.” Id. Both involve “a kind of proof or ordeal,” as well as
“speech, facts, judgments, authorities, writing, inscriptions, all manner of recordings and archives,
reference works, colleagues, and disputes.” Id. at 77, 82. However, Latour proceeds to destabilize
these easy comparisons. Although “judges appropriate the scientist’s white coat in order to
represent their role” and “scientists borrow the judge’s robes of purple and ermine in order to
establish their authority,” in fact there are important differences. Id. at 106.
104. Latour suggests that in science the object itself is judge. Id. at 106-07. In contrast, legal
objectivity “depends entirely on a quality of speech, deportment, dress, and on a form of
enunciation.” Id. at 107. Ultimately, lawyers and scientists have different tasks, and Latour argues
that “science should not be asked to judge, and . . . law should not be asked to pronounce truth.” Id.
at 113.
105. In this context, judicial power “demonstrates the special point of view, transcending
individual perspectives—the sovereign vision of the State.” Pierre Bourdiew, The Force of Law:
Toward a Sociology of the Juridical Field, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 805, 838 (1987). Bourdiew also
scrutinizes issues of power, judgment and violence in the work of legal professionals. Power within
the juridical field is tied to power more broadly, and Bourdiew, echoing the classic definition of the
state, notes the “permanent conflict between competing claims to the monopoly on the legitimate
exercise of juridical power.” Id. at 824.
106. Id. at 818. There is also a division of labor within the juridical field that “constitutes the
true basis of a system of norms and practices which appears as if it were founded a priori in the
equity of its principles, in the coherence of its formulations, and in the rigor of its application.” Id.
However, interpretation is not solely a judicial act, and it is also implicated within power relations.
Bourdiew explains, “The practical content of the law which emerges in the judgment is the product
of a symbolic struggle between professionals possessing unequal technical skills and social
influence,” and the real meaning of a rule “can be discovered in the specific power relation between
professionals.” Id. at 827.
107. Id. at 828 (emphasis in original). This process is not simply a rhetorical mask; it is “the
expression of the whole operation of the juridical field and, in particular, of the work of
rationalization to which the system of juridical norms is continually subordinated.” Id. at 820.

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2011

21

Akron Law Review, Vol. 44 [2011], Iss. 2, Art. 1

6_BRUCH_WESTERN 2.18.11.DOCM

354

2/22/2011 2:08 PM

AKRON LAW REVIEW

[44:333

decides, and it does so through processes constructed as rational and
objective, removed from the individuals involved.108
Once established, the bureaucracy of law has spread and flourished,
facilitated through processes of institutional isomorphism that lead to a
similarity of structures across society (and across societies).109
DiMaggio and Powell identify three mechanisms of isomorphic
change—coercive, mimetic, and normative isomorphism—which
operate primarily in the intertwined realms of the state, law, and
education.110 Coercive isomorphism occurs when change is mandated
by authority and, where necessary, enforced. The state and the law are
central in processes of coercive isomorphism;111 this is the force, the
violence, of law. In addition to coercive isomorphism, however, law is
also relevant in mimetic processes of isomorphism, where an institution
mimics or copies the conduct of other institutions for reasons other than
coercion.112 Because of the general power of the state, there is social
pressure to follow the practices of institutions that are successful within
the system; the practices of those institutions are, in turn, shaped by the
legal regime at work. Finally, the third mechanism of institutional
isomorphism, normative pressure, is also evident in both the law and the
working of the state system.113 Normative pressure is the sense of
“should” or “ought” that underlies the choice for a particular system or
process.114 Law is also at work in normative processes when legal
education is standardized (in part, through law), and lawyers are
ubiquitous in government bureaucracies and legislatures.115

108. Bourdiew explains that there is a process of rationalization at work in the juridical field
that results in a “social division between lay people and professionals” and that “constantly
increase[es] the separation between judgments based upon the law and naïve intuitions of fairness.”
Id. at 817. Deploying his concept of habitus, he suggests that “[t]he predictability and calculability
that Weber imputed to “rational law” doubtless arise more than anything else from the consistency
and homogeneity of the legal habitus.” Id. at 833.
109. Institutional isomorphism is the process that results in homogeneity of structures across
society due to social constraints. Paul J. DiMaggio & Walter W. Powell, The Iron Cage Revisited:
Institutional Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields, in CONTEMPORARY
SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY 146, 146-61 (Craig Calhoun et al. eds., Blackwell Publishers 2d ed. 2007)
(1983). See also Goodman & Jinks, supra note 66, at 650 (discussing processes of isomorphism in
human rights).
110. DiMaggio & Powell, supra note 109, at 149.
111. Id. at 150.
112. Id. at 151.
113. Id. at 152.
114. Education plays an essential role here, as well as systems of professionalization and
socialization. Id. at 153-54.
115. Turner and Factor note that “[t]he courtroom is an artificial setting, like the laboratory,
and, as with the laboratory, special training is required to understand fully what is going on within
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Processes of isomorphism help explain the increasing
rationalization of law and its systems and the proliferation of particular
types of systems, domestically as well as transnationally and
internationally. Mimetic and normative processes are manifest in the
prevalence of “model laws,” uniform documents and processes,
standardized education, and “best practices.” Yet law’s bureaucracy is
not distinct from law’s violence.116 Coercion and force do not disappear;
rather, they become techniques, subject to bureaucratic, technical
considerations.117
B.

The Role of the Expert

The role of the “objective” expert is essential as law does its work
through the bureaucratic practices of the individuals and institutions who
wield its power. Weber has traced the emergence of expertise in his
history of the rise of legal rationality.118 Although his focus is on the
development of law and procedure, the role of the expert is threaded
throughout:
From a theoretical point of view, the general development of law and
procedure may be viewed as passing through the following stages:
first, charismatic legal revelation through “law prophets”; second,
empirical creation and finding of law through legal honoratiores, i.e.,
law creation through cautelary jurisprudence and adherence to
precedent; third, imposition of law by secular or theocratic powers;
fourth and finally, systematic elaboration of law and professionalized
administration of justice by persons who have received their legal
training in a learned and formally logical manner.119

it.” TURNER & FACTOR, supra note 4, at 18. As a part of their training, lawyers learn to exclude
“non-legal” elements of reality from consideration within the legal system. Id. at 132.
116. Zygmunt Bauman also presents an analysis that explicates the links between bureaucracy
and violence in Modernity and the Holocaust. ZYGMUNT BAUMAN, MODERNITY AND THE
HOLOCAUST (1989). It was a failure of civilization—and of law—because “all those intricate
networks of checks and balances, barriers and hurdles which the civilizing process has erected and
which, as we hope and trust, would defend us from violence and constrain all over ambitious and
unscrupulous powers, have been proven ineffective.” Id. at 87. Bauman contends that the
Holocaust was enabled by “the ability of modern bureaucracy to co-ordinate the action of great
number[s] of moral individuals in the pursuit of any, also immoral, ends.” Id. at 18. This was
accomplished through “routine bureaucratic procedures: means-ends calculus, budget balancing,
universal rule application.” Id. at 17 (emphasis in original).
117. Id. Bourdiew also reminds us that “the State alone holds the monopoly of legitimized
symbolic violence.” Bourdiew, supra note 105, at 838.
118. WEBER, supra note 2, at 641-900.
119. Id. at 882.
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In fact, Weber contrasts the role of the legal expert in the
rationalized legal system with the exceptional case of the jury, where
laypersons can adjudicate according to “irrational” standards.120 Trained
jurists are distinguished by “that special capacity which results from
specialized professional training, viz., the capacity to state clearly and
unambiguously the legal issue involved in a complicated situation.”121
These university-trained jurists and advocates—due to their
expertise—become an important aspect of the development of the
rational state as well as the rationalized legal system.122 In this context,
a decisive quality is judgment: “the ability to maintain one’s inner
composure and calm while being receptive to realities, in other words
distance from things and people.”123 This same sense of a trained,
impersonal, and “objective” specialist appears in the role of the
bureaucratic official generally.124 As bureaucracy rationalizes and
dehumanizes itself, it increasingly relies upon the expert “who is all the
more indifferent in human terms, and so all the more completely
“objective” the more complex and specialised the culture becomes.”125
As with law’s violence, this understanding of law’s bureaucracy
raises questions of power. The increasing rationalization of the legal
system and the rise of expertise reflect a political transformation and a
new type of power relations.126 Judicial power, which has been central,

120. Id. at 892-95.
121. Id. at 853.
122. Weber elaborates the role of the expert, particularly the legal expert, in his broader
discussion of politics and politicians (where lawyers often play a significant role). MAX WEBER,
The Profession and Vocation of Politics, in WEBER: POLITICAL WRITINGS 309, 328-29 (Peter
Lassman & Ronald Speirs eds., Cambridge Univ. Press 1994) (1919). He traces the rise of
“professional officialdom,” first as a counter-force to autocratic rule and then as a counterpart to
political officials. Id. at 322-25.
123. Id. at 353 (emphasis in original). Weber continues: “A ‘lack of distance’, in and of itself,
is one of the deadly sins for any politician and it is one of those qualities which will condemn our
future intellectuals to political incompetence if they cultivate it.” Id. at 353.
124. See WEBER, The Development of Bureaucracy and its Relation to Law, in MAX WEBER:
SELECTIONS IN TRANSLATION, supra note 4, at 341-54.
125. Id. at 351.
126. Foucault also traces the origin of the legal system with attention to increased
rationalization and the rise of a system of “inquiry.” 3 MICHEL FOUCAULT, Truth and Juridical
Forms, in POWER: ESSENTIAL WORKS OF FOUCAULT, 1954-1984 1, 48 (James D. Faubion ed.,
Robert Hurley et al. trans., The New Press 1994) (1974). He begins with an archaic form of the
“rule-governed dispute, the challenge between the two warriors” that determines who is right rather
than who speaks the truth. Id. at 33. In such a procedure, there was “no judge, judgment, inquiry,
or testimony to determine who spoke the truth.” Id. However, over time, this process gives way to
the elaboration of more rational forms of proof and demonstration through processes of inquiry and
the juridical discovery of truth. Id. at 33-34. This new mode of proceeding broadens the dispute to
include not just the interests of the parties in conflict, but also the interests of the sovereign (or
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now operates in conjunction with a “whole network of nonjudicial
power,” particularly the experts who become so prevalent in the
bureaucratized state.127 These experts include the administrators,
officials, staff, and consultants that are responsible for so much of the
day to day work of the legal system. They purport to offer certainty,
clarity, distance, objectivity, and rationality to non-experts as they seek
to navigate the complexities of the law, the legal system, or even the
everyday world.
C.

The Bureaucratization of Human Rights and the Emergence of the
International Expert

Law’s bureaucracy—and the rationalization of law and the
significance of expertise—also manifests in international law and the
international legal system.
These features are evident in the
international human rights institutional and legal framework that is often
partnered with humanitarian intervention. Although social scientists
have only begun to examine human rights and human rights law
relatively recently, in their analyses, bureaucracy and instrumentalism
have emerged as common themes.128 Annelise Riles suggests that “an

state). The settlement of disputes is “imposed from above,” and both the judge and prosecutor
appear “as manifestations of the sovereign’s interest in the dispute.” Id. at 42-43. When the
sovereign’s interest is asserted, the criminal is redefined as “the social enemy.” Id. at 54.
127. Id. at 57. The hierarchies embedded in relationships of “distant” and “objective” expertise
have increasingly been interrogated and critiqued in recent decades in legal and social theory. For
example, feminist scholar Dorothy Smith critiques the pursuit of “objectivity” in expertise.
DOROTHY E. SMITH, THE EVERYDAY WORLD AS PROBLEMATIC: A FEMINIST SOCIOLOGY 105-45
(1989). Smith is primarily concerned with the expertise of the sociologist, but her analysis has
broader relevance. As an alternative to traditional views, Smith suggests a fundamental shift in the
relationship of expert and non-expert that would discard “the detached scientific consciousness” that
is so important to the idea of expertise, especially bureaucratic and legal expertise. Id. at 111. If
non-expert laypeople are recognized as having their own form of expertise grounded in experience
(like the expert), the expert loses some of the “distance” that underlies expertise. Id. at 107, 110.
The idea of the expert as exclusive holder and purveyor of objective knowledge is destabilized, and
there is recognition that distance and detachment are socially constructed because the expert is
never really “outside” the relations being observed, analyzed or interpreted. Id. at 94.
128. Tola Olu Pearce, Human Rights and Sociology: Some Observations from Africa, 48
SOCIAL PROBLEMS 48, 48-56 (2001); Riles, supra note 2, at 52-65; Malcolm Waters, Globalisation
and the Social Construction of Human Rights, 31 J. SOCIOLOGY 29, 29-36 (1995). Malcolm Waters
explores the institutionalization of human rights from “a social constructionist point of view, a view
that human rights is an institution that is specific to cultural and historical context just like any
other, and that its very universality is itself a human construction.” Id. at 32. He traces the rise of
current human rights discourse, its strategic use by global superpowers and the (intended and
unintended) consequences for state sovereignty, and he concludes that human rights
institutionalization is “the outcome of instrumental action by power groups seeking to realize their
interests.” Id. at 35. Waters calls for investigation of the processes that have led to
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instrumentalist conception of law is the agreed theoretical and political
basis of modern U.S. law,” and this in turn has greatly influenced the
development of international law, including human rights law.129 In
familiar language, she contends that the “understanding of law as a tool
or instrument also provides the concrete, day-to-day form of legal
knowledge practice—that of thinking in terms of relations of means to
ends.”130 This bureaucratic, “technocratic” approach in everyday
practice has resulted in a view of human rights as “a set of problemsolving institutions and of legal techniques deployed and managed by
international bureaucrats.”131 These institutions and the international
experts who manage them appear mostly obviously in the bureaucracies
of the United Nations and its subsidiary agencies and institutions (and
the regional inter-governmental organizations that are their
counterparts). However, similar institutions and models of expertise are
also found in the international field presences established in
humanitarian interventions.
After an initial intervention, the international community typically
establishes a formal bureaucracy and begins a process of governance of
the local population, using ‘objective’ experts to accomplish its work.
The human rights bureaucracies created in field missions under the
auspices of inter-governmental and multi-state interventions aspire to
and, at times, reflect familiar characteristics of objectivity, efficiency,
rationality, and distance. Often, they import with them a new and
“rational” legal system, typically modeled on international law or

institutionalization in human rights, and Pearce makes a related call for a closer look at the role of
bureaucracy in human rights. Id.; PEARCE, supra, at 53.
129. RILES, supra note 2, at 59.
130. Id.
131. Id. Despite its bureaucratic instrumentalism, the human rights apparatus is increasingly
looked to as a potential source of power both within and outside the state. Bryan Turner has noted
the progression of rights discourse from a natural to a global discourse; he has also noted that
scholars have focused attention on the political utility of rights as an articulation of “an international
standard of justice.” Bryan S. Turner, Introduction: Rights and Communities: Prolegomenon to a
Sociology of Rights, 31 J. SOCIOLOGY 1, 7 (1995). R.W. Connell elaborates on this view. R.W.
Connell, Sociology and Human Rights, 31 J. SOCIOLOGY 25, 25-29 (1995). Connell departs from
the common sociological critique of rights as either “a form of individualist ideology that conceals
real social relations” or “a legal discourse that constructs a subjectivity inevitably subordinated to
juridical state power.” Id. at 25. Instead, Connell explains that it is important to recognize “the
diversity of situations in which rights talk is deployed, and grasp the different historical
consequences of its deployment.” Id. at 27. Rights claims are an assertion of power, yet they also
go beyond existing relations of power to “describe[] a state of practice that does not exist.” Id. at
28. Echoing Cover’s earlier remarks about law as an “imagined future,” Connell suggests that
claims of rights similarly reflect a “project,” “a vision of a world coming into existence.” Id.;
COVER, supra note 12, at 207.

http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol44/iss2/1

26

Bruch: Is International Law Really Law?

6_BRUCH_WESTERN 2.18.11.DOCM

2011]

IS INTERNATIONAL LAW REALLY LAW?

2/22/2011 2:08 PM

359

standards.132 The processes of isomorphism that proliferate within
bureaucratic systems (and lead to the reproduction of such systems
themselves) are at work as these new, internationally approved
frameworks are adopted or imposed in the name of (re)establishing the
“rule of law.”133
Historically, the idea of the rule of law has been linked to a
democratic framework and self-governance, and in field missions, the
development of such a framework has generally been the goal.
However, in practice, it has been an approach of “externally imposing a
rights framework outside the political process of debate and consensusbuilding” in the affected nation.134
This is typically seen as
unproblematic given the “universal” and “progressive” nature of human
rights.135 Nonetheless, this approach creates a “rule of law paradox,”
132. Law’s force becomes subject to bureaucratic, technical considerations as international
interventions make this shift to the establishment of a field mission focused on rebuilding the
nation. See supra Part II.B, regarding the violence that accompanies this process of “bringing the
law” to a nation in conflict or transition, as well as the echoes of the imperial past in such
endeavors. PETER FITZPATRICK, THE MYTHOLOGY OF MODERN LAW 101 (1992). Fitzpatrick also
suggests that in the imperial context, “law was pre-eminent amongst the ‘gifts’ of an expansive
civilization, on which could extend in its abounding generosity to the entire globe.” PETER
FITZPATRICK, MODERNISM AND THE GROUNDS OF LAW 178 (2001). See ALBERT MEMMI, THE
COLONIZER AND THE COLONIZED (1991) (discussing colonial relationships). See also RAZACK,
supra note 9, at 9-10 (noting a shared feature of both nineteenth century and contemporary projects
of empire is “a deeply held belief in the need to and the right to dominate others for their own good,
others who are expected to be grateful”) (emphasis in original).
133. Goodman & Jinks, supra note 66, at 650-51. Goodman and Jinks discuss the ways in
which human rights norms are spread based upon ideas dominant in the international arena rather
than through internal development in affected states. They suggest that “when states copy an
internationally legitimated model that does not fit their local needs, one should expect a continued
disjuncture between structural isomorphism (across states) and technical demands and results
(within states).” Id. at 651.
134. David Chandler, The Bureaucratic Gaze of International Human Rights Law, in THE
LEGALIZATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS: MULTIDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND
HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 128, 128-29 (Saladin Meckled-García and Başak Çali eds., 2006). Chandler
notes that “[t]he ‘rule of law’ did not mean merely that there was a set of rules and regulations or
laws, but that this framework was predicated on consent, the equality of rights and the autonomy of
individuals.” Id. at 129. It distinguishes itself from “the rule of bureaucratic regulation or
authoritarian repression” and from “the ‘divine right’ of kings or the ‘civilizing’ mission of a
colonial administration.” Id.
135. See Cornell & Salisbury, supra note 71 (analyzing this power of the international
community as a positive force in support of the rule of law). But see PETER FITZPATRICK, THE
MYTHOLOGY OF MODERN LAW 117-18 (1992) (noting how the “rule of law” has become a new
“universal measure of appropriate behaviour” and as a marker of civilization in contrast to
barbarism); FITZPATRICK, MODERNISM AND THE GROUNDS OF LAW 181 (2001) (pointing out that
“the colonist claimed to bring law from the outside, a civilized law of universal valency free from
polluting involvement with the particularity of the local scene”). In the context of humanitarian
intervention, this can, of course, be counter-productive in numerous ways: it appears (and may be)
undemocratic, it may consequently lack validity and legitimacy, and it ignores the valid critiques
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where the importation of a rationalized legal regime to protect human
rights and the rule of law may actually undermine both—at least in
process, and potentially, in effect.136
The imposition of the new legal framework, and often its initial
work, is managed by international administrators, bureaucrats, and
experts. In fact, the idea of expertise takes on particular significance in
the context of the “field,” where location itself becomes partially
constitutive of expertise. The expert becomes the “international expert.”
Early social theorist Georg Simmel first connected this question of
“location” with the “distant” standpoint that is often embedded in
notions of objectivity in expertise. Simmel’s essay “The Stranger”
explores the relationship of the stranger and the group and unearths an
expertise in the standpoint of the stranger: “[The stranger] is the freer
man, practically and theoretically; he examines conditions with less
prejudice; he assesses them against standards that are more general and
more objective; and his actions are not confined to custom, piety, or
precedent.”137 In part, expertise arises from the mobility and freedom of
the stranger, which leads to different types of experiences and
perspectives than those of the group.
However, the stranger’s expertise is also grounded in a sort of
objectivity, but this objectivity is not based solely on distance (as
Weber’s “objectivity” may suggest), but rather upon a tension between
distance from and embeddedness within the group.138 The stranger is
involved with the group, and thus, may have a unique access to the facts
as an outsider within the group.139 Yet the stranger also remains
detached, with an objectivity that is not simply non-participation but
reflects the lack of ties to the group that may “prejudice his perception,

that have emerged about existing human rights law. See, e.g., Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na‘im,
Problems of Universal Cultural Legitimacy for Human Rights, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN AFRICA:
CROSS-CULTURAL PERSPECTIVES 331, 348-53 (Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na‘im & Francis M. Deng
eds., 1990) (discussing the exclusion of non-western participants and perspectives in the early
development of the international human rights regime); CHARLESWORTH & CHINKIN, supra note 8,
at 36-37 (identifying a “Southern” critique of the “Western origins, orientation and cultural bias” of
the international legal order).
136. Chandler, supra note 134, at 121.
137. Georg Simmel, The Stranger, in CLASSICAL SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY, supra note 4, at
297.
138. The stranger’s objective attitude “does not signify mere detachment and nonparticipation,
but is a distinct structure composed of remoteness and nearness, indifference and involvement.” Id.
at 296.
139. Simmel suggests that the stranger often has access to “revelations and confidences” from
members of the group that are generally kept hidden. Id.
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his understanding, and his assessment of data.”140 There are risks,
however, to the expert who operates both within and outside the group—
risks to the stranger and his or her ideas if they are identified as foreign
or coming from outside.141
This tension in expertise as a stranger, or outsider, doing
transnational or international work, especially in the “field” has been
further elaborated by contemporary theorists. Critical geographer,
Jennifer Hyndman, explains:
Just as there is tension between discourses of universality and
particularity—the shared language and entitlements of human rights
versus distinguishing cultural practices—a discursive distance between
“here” and “there,” “us” and “them,” confounds any singular
understanding of culture. “The field” is a diffuse and problematic term
for . . . [those] who travel in a privileged way across cultures. For
some, “the field” is a place impossibly outside the power relations that
organize “home.”142

In fact, the relationships that develop or are constructed across
those boundaries of home and field in transnational work often evolve
into relations of “sub-citizens” and “supra-citizens.”143 This sense of
citizenship reflects the hierarchy and status distinctions in international
work, including consequences to mobility and authority within and
across national borders. The mobility and freedom of the “supracitizen,” like the mobility of the stranger, leads to different types of
experiences and perspectives than those of the “sub-citizens.” However,
it also translates into broader—where you are comes to define who you
are, as much as who you are defines where you are—in the asymmetrical
relationships of “international” experts and “local” non-experts in the
field.144
140. Id. at 297. In fact, Simmel uses a type of legal expert to exemplify this objective
standpoint—judges recruited from “outside” the community because they have no family or other
entanglements. Id. at 296. For these experts, their “objective” expertise arises, in part, quite
literally from distance.
141. Id. at 297 (Simmel calls these “dangerous possibilities”).
142. JENNIFER HYNDMAN, MANAGING DISPLACEMENT: REFUGEES AND THE POLITICS OF
HUMANITARIANISM 88-89 (Borderlines Ser. Vol. 16, 2000).
143. Id. at 110-11.
144. See ORFORD, supra note 3, at 119-20 (pointing out that “‘the international’ . . . becomes
that which major powers wish to claim or own—peace, democracy, security, liberty—while “the
local” becomes that for which major powers do not wish to take responsibility”); Alison Mountz,
Embodying the Nation-State: Canada’s Response to Human Smuggling, 23 POL. GEOGRAPHY 323,
336 (2004). See also Chandler, supra note 134, at 128; Upendra Baxi, Politics of Reading Human
Rights, in THE LEGALIZATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS: MULTIDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES ON HUMAN
RIGHTS AND HUMAN RIGHTS LAW, supra note 134, at 182-200.
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Human rights work, particularly in the context of humanitarian
intervention, raises similar and related questions of expertise,
objectivity, and relationship. In some sense, the whole idea of a field
mission—and humanitarian intervention more generally—rests on the
supposed objectivity of outside observers, strangers, and experts. The
international expert, like the stranger, is supposed to observe with less
prejudice, with few ties to custom, using general and objective (in fact,
universal) standards. Yet experience suggests that such “international”
experts are as grounded in their own locations, perspectives, interests,
and customs as “local” others.145 As with law’s violence, closer
interrogation of law’s bureaucracy and objective expertise complicates
traditional understandings in ways that have significance for evaluating
contemporary bureaucratic practices, including the everyday practices of
international experts in humanitarian interventions.
They raise
important questions of what the “rule of law” or the “international
expert” offers in situations of conflict or transition and whether it is
possible to imagine a more balanced engagement that reflects and
appreciates both the embeddedness of the “objective” outsider and the
expertise of the “subjects” of international interventions.
IV. TECHNIQUES OF LAW AND LAW AS TECHNIQUE: HUMAN RIGHTS AS
GOVERNANCE
Although law’s originating and maintaining violence and law’s
bureaucratic rationality are significant dimensions of its nature and
work, in both domestic and international arenas, law’s reach extends
beyond the confines of any particular legal system(s) or set of legal
processes. This section considers law as governance, as law expands its
scope and transforms itself to discipline, shape, produce, and govern the
members of society—local, national, or global—in countless ways. This
section will first discuss the contention that governance or
“governmentality” has displaced more traditional forms of power in
society and the consequences of that move for law. It will then examine
the practices and institutions of governance, including the recurring role

145. See CHANDLER, supra note 134, at 128. Chandler identifies some of the inequities in the
context of Bosnia: “Internationals involved in the drawing up of laws are too often more focused on
‘high salaries, low expenses and a “per-diem rich environment”’ resulting in bad laws.” Id. (citing
the Democratization Policy Institute). See also BAXI, supra note 144. Baxi notes that “[h]uman
rights career bureaucrats/technocrats define their roles in ways that intermingle their positional
advantage while pursuing the proliferation of human rights norms and standards.” Id. at 194. See
also RAZACK, supra note 9, at 45 (discussing the prevalence of such attitudes in the Canadian
peace-keeping mission in Somalia, but also in other humanitarian interventions around the globe).
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of expertise. Human rights and humanitarian intervention will be used
to provide illustration that law as governance is not limited to the
domestic context but also appears in international law.
A.

The Rise of Governmentality

In his important and foundational essay “Governmentality,” Michel
Foucault addresses the “problematic of government” and elaborates the
idea of governmentality as a configuration of power.146 The rise of
government occurs in the wake of the decline (or reconfiguration) of
sovereignty, as historically understood. Traditionally, sovereignty or
sovereign power relied upon the law (backed by force) to achieve its
aims—“law and sovereignty were absolutely inseparable.”147 With the
emergence of government as a form of power, the relationship with law
is transformed: “[W]ith government it is a question not of imposing law
on men but of disposing of things: that is, of employing tactics rather
than laws, and even of using laws themselves as tactics—to arrange
things in such a way that, through a certain number of means, such-andsuch ends may be achieved.”148 Law is no longer a simple manifestation
of sovereign will, but rather one tool among many for the exercise of
power.
The idea of “governmentality” captures the sense that power
achieves its objectives as it becomes internalized in practices of selfgovernment, within individuals or, more broadly, within societies. In a
general sense, “governmentality simply refers to any manner in which
people think about, and put into practice, calculated plans for governing

146. FOUCAULT, supra note 4, at 229.
147. Id. at 237.
148. Id. In Foucault and Law: Towards a Sociology of Law as Governance, Alan Hunt and
Gary Wickham explain that Foucault often displaced the role of law in order to focus on other forms
of power, and as a result, he did not directly engage with law itself at great length. HUNT &
WICKHAM, supra note 4. In many ways, he limited the role of law by linking it to sovereign power
and negative, “juridico-discursive” conceptions of power. Id. at 40-43. Nonetheless, they suggest
that although “[l]aw is never one of his explicit objects of inquiry . . . he has a considerable amount
to say about law.” Id. at 39. Hunt and Wickham find links to law in his major themes of power,
discipline, and governmentality, among other areas. In tracking the movement from sovereignty to
disciplinary society, Foucault sets aside law to focus on the processes of discipline, and he presents
law and discipline as “dual but opposing processes.” Id. at 46. Hunt and Wickham suggest that he
also identifies the “interaction and interdependence of disciplinary practices and their legal
framework.” Id. at 47. In this context, law is both constitutive of and a “mask of real power.” Id.
at 48. Foucault’s displacement of law to focus on other forms of power (especially micro-power)
also appears in his work on governmentality, where “he stresses the essentially non-legal character
of his expanded conception of government.” Id. at 52.
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themselves.”149 More specifically, it is “a particular mode of deploying
and reflecting upon power.”150 Neither sovereignty nor disciplinary
practices are necessarily replaced by government, but rather a new
dimension is added. Foucault offers a triangular view of power as
“sovereignty-discipline-government, which has as its primary target the
population and as its essential mechanism the apparatuses of
security.”151
While Weber considered the modern state dependent on
bureaucracy, Foucault offers that it functions based upon the
“dispositional and technocratic logic of governmentality.”152 With the
“governmentalization” of the state, the sovereign authority, and even the
law itself, has less and less significance.153 Instead, power is largely
directed at the population through schemes of reform, pedagogy, and
governance. This results in “the formation of a whole series of specific
governmental apparatuses, and . . . in the development of a whole
complex of knowledges.”154 These governmental apparatuses and
bodies of knowledge include the legal system and the law but also
extend beyond the law to include projects of education, social work, and
other efforts to manage or reform the population. Law then becomes
integrated into governance strategies to manage social problems and
concerns.155
Other theorists have questioned the idea that the move to
governmentality necessarily results in a lesser significance or role for
law in society.156 For example, Hunt and Wickham contend that law
retains a prominent status even as power relations shift: “[L]aw has
been a primary agent of the advance of new modalities of power, [and]
149. BEN GOLDER & PETER FITZPATRICK, FOUCAULT’S LAW 31 (2009). Golder and
Fitzpatrick join other scholars in interrogating the relationship of law to Foucault’s theories of
power. They “locate Foucault’s law between a subordinated law and a surpassing law, between a
law which is confined by the emerging modalities of disciplinary power and bio-power and one
which is illimitable and always going beyond itself and those who would seek to instrumentalize it.”
Id. at 39.
150. Id. at 31.
151. FOUCAULT, supra note 4, at 243.
152. GOLDER & FITZPATRICK, supra note 149, at 32.
153. FOUCAULT, supra note 4, at 244. Foucault controversially asserts that the state “is no
more than a composite reality and a mythicized abstraction, whose importance is a lot more limited
than many of us think.” Id.
154. Id.
155. GOLDER & FITZPATRICK, supra note 149, at 33.
156. In their critique of Foucault’s work, Hunt and Wickham note that Foucault tends to focus
on a narrow conception of law that centers on criminal law and ignores the multiple other sources
and forms of law (which appears to be a common feature of sociological inquiries into law). HUNT
& WICKHAM, supra note 4, at 60.
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law constitutes distinctive features of their mode of operation.”157 They
suggest that Foucault’s theories of governmentality must be framed in
dialogue with the work of Weber, among others; from that perspective,
“all operations of law are instances of governance.”158 Governmentality
and the rise of governance are, at least in part, “about the growth of
modern government and the growth of modern bureaucracies.”159 In
fact, these familiar bureaucratic institutions are where governmental
power is exercised through a wide range of regulatory practices. Public
law, while not synonymous with governmentality, is always involved in
either exercising control over or exempting from control the different
projects of governance.160
Although scholars may disagree about the extent to which law is
displaced by the rise of governmentality, it is clear that its role changes
as forms of power shift. In a sense, the triangular model of power
offered by Foucault of sovereignty-discipline-government is reflected in
law’s multi-dimensional nature as violence-bureaucracy-governance and
in the ways power is exercised through the courts, administrators, and
civil society.161 Violence remains an important component of law—
connected to its origins, its preservation, and its enforcement—and
bureaucracy retains its significance in the formal institutions and
processes of the legal system itself. Law as governmentality, however,
captures another dimension. In the modern state, law is pervasive; it
extends its reach outside of the formal legal system to the encompassing
and overlapping array of efforts to manage society. In turn, those
projects of governance also shape the content and scope of the law,
domestically, and increasingly in the international realm as well.
B.

Doing the Work of Governance

Government, like bureaucracy, is accomplished through the
activities and practices of a wide range of specialized experts. However,
the power of government arises not from a static, all-powerful sovereign
or state, but rather from “an assemblage of forces” organized into
“mobile and loosely affiliated networks” that include both state officials

157. Id. at 65.
158. Id. at 99.
159. Id. at 76.
160. Id. at 66.
161. For example, Sarat suggests a Foucauldian understanding of “rival centers of power” in
law where violence is tempered “within law’s complex chain of command.” Sarat, supra note 34, at
263.
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and numerous other practitioners in the public and private spheres.162
Governance occurs through the “assorted attempts at the calculated
administration of diverse aspects of conduct through countless, often
competing, local tactics of education, persuasion, inducement,
management, incitement, motivation and encouragement.”163 In this
more indirect manifestation of power, it is the various “experts” who
provide the links between political authorities and individuals; they
ensure that “self-regulatory techniques can be installed in citizens that
will align their personal choices with the ends of government.”164
The task of expertise in governance is not one of “weaving an allpervasive web of ‘social control,’” but a more diffuse (though equally
powerful) management of individuals as members of society.165 Law
works in conjunction with expertise; it “translates aspects of a
governmental programme into mechanisms that establish, constrain or
empower certain agents or entities and set some of the key terms of their
deliberations.”166 In a sense, law is meaningful in conferring expertise
and shaping the confines of expert authority, both within and outside the
legal system. Law may be a specific tactic of government, but it also
operates more broadly to contour the range of possibilities available to
individuals, to experts, and even to the state. This is evident in the
familiar practices of the extended systems of justice, social work, public
health, and so forth—that include networks of actors, legal and other
experts, and official and unofficial participants.
In a more exceptional but equally relevant context, law’s multidimensionality—governance working together with violence and
bureaucracy—appears in recent practices of detention, notably indefinite
detention, in the “War on Terror.”167 Drawing upon Foucault and
Agamben, Judith Butler elaborates the reemergence of sovereign power
“within the field of governmentality.”168 In the environment of
indefinite detention, law is used instrumentally as a tactic of
162. PETER MILLER & NIKOLAS ROSE, Political Power Beyond the State: Problematics of
Government, in GOVERNING THE PRESENT: ADMINISTERING ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND PERSONAL
LIFE 53, 64 (2008).
163. Id. at 55. Rose extends Foucault’s theory of governmentality and elaborates its
connections to law. He discusses the shifting nature of power in modern forms of government and
the centrality of knowledge to governmental activities, first in the welfare state and then in the neoliberal state. Id.
164. Id. at 69.
165. Id. at 55.
166. Id. at 70.
167. JUDITH BUTLER, Indefinite Detention, in PRECARIOUS LIFE: THE POWERS OF MOURNING
AND VIOLENCE 50, 50-100 (2004).
168. Id. at 53. See AGAMBEN, supra note 54.
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governmentality.169 Law is nominally suspended, both national law and
international law, and a new exercise of sovereignty takes place outside
the law through administrative bureaucracies.170 This sovereignty is
linked to both governance and bureaucracy—“[p]etty sovereigns
abound,” and these bureaucrats become “part of the apparatus of
governmentality.”171
Once again, the exceptional moment of the suspension of law
reveals the convergence of different forms of power and the shifting role
of law.172 Law is redefined; it is no longer “that to which the state is
subject nor that which distinguishes between lawful state action and
unlawful, but is now expressly understood as an instrument, an
instrumentality of power, one that can be applied and suspended at
will.”173 From the routine administrative tasks of the social welfare
system to the exceptional circumstances of indefinite detention, theorists
have begun to trace the essential dimensions of law as violence,
bureaucracy, and governance. A multi-dimensional perspective that
accounts for this complexity enables a fuller understanding of the nature
and operations of law in diverse settings—from the familiar to the
extraordinary, and beyond the state to the international realm of
humanitarian intervention.
C.

Projects of Governance in International Interventions

Humanitarian interventions begin as the projects of states and intergovernmental organizations but, like other projects of governance,
expand to include a larger and more diffuse network of actors. Because
there is no global sovereign, international law has long struggled with

169. BUTLER, supra note 167, at 54.
170. Id. at 51.
171. Id. at 56, 59.
172. Butler contends that
[t]he suspension of the rule of law allows for the convergence of governmentality and sovereignty;
sovereignty is exercised in the act of suspension, but also in the self-allocation of legal prerogative;
governmentality denotes an operation of administrative power that is extra-legal, even as it can and
does return to law as a field of tactical operations.
Id. at 55. Butler notes that “contemporary forms of sovereignty exist in a structurally inverse
relation to the rule of law, emerging precisely at that moment when the rule of law is suspended and
withdrawn.” Id. at 60 (emphasis in original).
173. Id. at 83. In turn, sovereignty becomes “the variable application, contortion, and
suspension of the law; it is, in its current form, a relation to law: exploitative, instrumental,
disdainful, preemptory, arbitrary.” Id.
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questions of power.174 In this milieu, a Foucauldian understanding of
power is especially useful, where power is “employed and exercised in
relations between people, rather than existing as a commodity that can
be monopolized by a single entity,” such as the state or even an intergovernmental organization like the United Nations.175 Instead, a
defining feature of humanitarian intervention is that an “assemblage of
actors” come together—nation-states, inter-governmental bodies, nongovernmental organizations, and individuals—to urge forceful
intervention in the name of human rights and to manage the aftermath of
that intervention. International law is not just forceful or violent; it does
not simply represent a return to the rational and objective rule of law. It
also serves as a form of pedagogy, a discipline, and a project of
reform.176 Human rights, in particular, are often “pedagogically
induced” through efforts to promote rights protection and (re)train the
population.177
In humanitarian intervention, the international community—
broadly defined—“constitutes itself in these texts of intervention and
reconstruction as a designer of new worlds, a solver of problems, and a
saviour of suffering peoples.”178 Humanitarian interventions have come
to underpin the self-image of both the international community and
(international) law “as a guarantor of peace, human rights and
democracy.”179
From one perspective, it is possible to view
humanitarian intervention and the importation of a human rights legal
framework as a means to reform the nation (and its population) into an
idealized, modern, even rationalized form of society.180 But if “human
rights are a means to engage the social discourse in providing a shape
174. These include the enduring questions of “how to orient international law to power, or how
best to deal with the realities of the operation of power in the international sphere.” ORFORD, supra
note 3, at 73.
175. Id. at 75.
176. Id. at 54.
177. PHENG CHEAH, INHUMAN CONDITIONS: ON COSMOPOLITANISM AND HUMAN RIGHTS 232
(2006).
178. ORFORD, supra note 3, at 142. Bauman uses a powerful metaphor of the “gardening”
state, which “view[s] the society it rules as an object of designing, cultivating and weed-poisoning.”
Although his focus is elsewhere, this is evocative of the rise of practices of discipline and
governmentality in the modern state. This suggests, once again, the linkages among the different
facets of law. BAUMAN, supra note 116, at 13.
179. ORFORD, supra note 3, at 19. Along similar lines, Marchak suggests that the flaws of
humanitarian intervention might be overcome by shifting involvement to a “disinterested”
institution, such as an organization of experts. MARCHAK, supra note 4, at 287.
180. LEONARD M. HAMMER, A FOUCAULDIAN APPROACH TO INTERNATIONAL LAW:
DESCRIPTIVE THOUGHTS FOR NORMATIVE ISSUES 72 (2007). This also reflects the colonial history
discussed earlier.
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and context to society,” then the relationships of power and the actors
multiply.181 Because of this diffusion of power, another perspective
contends that human rights may also be used as a counter-hegemonic
tool of social struggle.182 The role of law in such projects of governance
is, thus, more ambivalent.
For many advocates and activists, and many scholars, human rights
work turns away from the (violent and bureaucratic) law and becomes a
project and vision of ‘global civil society.’183 Hammer notes a trend in
international law to reshape the human rights regime to a broadly
defined human security regime, which more closely tracks Foucault’s
notion of governmentality. With a focus on human security, “the
relationship with the sovereign state [alters] from one of function to that
of transaction.”184 In this framework, “the area in which the human
dwells is the focus, with the task falling on the government, international
organizations, non-governmental organizations and the populace at large
to become active producers within the overall political system.”185
Others have suggested that the turn away from law shifts the focus to
broader notions of justice.186 For example, Kurasawa contends that the
dominant legal framework of human rights is inadequate and obscures
actual, emancipatory practices of justice.187 Instead, “struggle represents
the core” of the enactment of human rights and global justice in the

181. Id. at 95. The “dichotomous relationship between the sovereign state and the individual”
that is foundational in human rights is displaced. Id. at 90.
182. Id. at 93.
183. For many, ‘global civil society’ is embodied in the activists (and activism) “beyond
borders” examined by Keck and Sikkink. See KECK & SIKKINK, supra note 10. See also THE
PRACTICE OF HUMAN RIGHTS: TRACKING LAW BETWEEN THE GLOBAL AND THE LOCAL, supra note
183 (including a range of examples of human rights practices by both international and local
activists and NGOs).
184. HAMMER, supra note 180, at 110.
185. Id. at 111.
186. For example, Nancy Fraser argues for an expanded notion of justice in the face of
globalization and the changing nature and role of the nation state. Nancy Fraser, Reframing Justice
in a Globalizing World, NEW LEFT REVIEW 36, 1-19 (2005). Justice in the globalizing world
requires not only a redefinition of what constitutes justice, but also of who can make justice
claims—“it is not only the substance of justice, but also the frame, which is in dispute.” Id. at 4.
Fraser suggests a new frame drawing upon the “all-affected principle.” Id. at 13. Under such a
frame, “all those affected by a given social structure or institution have moral standing as subjects of
justice in relation to it.” Id. She suggests that justice must now include “the political dimension of
representation” so that justice is “parity of participation.” Id. at 5 (emphasis in original). The
inclusion of a political dimension to justice raises questions of law—state jurisdiction and decisionmaking rules, membership and procedure. Id. at 6-7.
187. FUYUKI KURASAWA, THE WORK OF GLOBAL JUSTICE: HUMAN RIGHTS AS PRACTICES 4
(2007).
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practices of global civil society, primarily outside traditional legal
institutions.188
Others are more skeptical about the increasing role of civil society
and the emancipatory potential this transformation may represent.189
When governmental and disciplinary technologies are increasingly
deployed by a shifting combination of government and nongovernmental actors, the interests of civil society and the state may
become more and more aligned.190 Civil society, then, becomes one
more “domain for the articulation and formation of the people’s interests
through governmental technologies.”191 This same process is at work at
the international level. Whether they are the benign force some imagine
or more problematic, the organizations and networks of global civil
society are significant in both the development and the implementation
In
of international law, and especially human rights law.192

188. Id. at 15. Kurasawa identifies these human rights practices as bearing witness,
forgiveness, foresight, aid, and solidarity. He acknowledges that some human rights practices do
become institutionalized, such as the formal methods of bearing witness and forgiveness through
international tribunals and truth and reconciliation commissions. Id. at 27, 56. In addition, law may
play a role in structuring the range and modes of practice available, but it is a limited one; law may
determine criminal responsibility for injustice, but it has less to do with moral responsibility and
political responsibility which are important aspects of global justice. Id. at 76. See also Elizabeth
M. Bruch, Book Review: The Work of Global Justice: Human Rights as Practices (Fuyuki
Kurasawa), 34 CAN. J. SOCIOLOGY, Winter 2009, at 207-09.
189. . Foucault demonstrated some ambivalence in this regard. In his statement, Confronting
Governments: Human Rights, Foucault seems to envision and even embrace an increasing role for
“the community of the governed,” which obliges members to “show mutual solidarity.” FOUCAULT,
Confronting Governments: Human Rights, in THE ESSENTIAL FOUCAULT: SELECTIONS FROM
ESSENTIAL WORKS OF FOUCAULT, 1954-1984, supra note 4, at 64. However, in Truth and Juridical
Forms, he also expresses some skepticism, at least historically, of the role of civil society actors as
enforcers of disciplinary society. FOUCAULT, supra note 126, at 60.
190. CHEAH, supra note 177, at 254.
191. Id. at 256.
192. HAMMER, supra note 180, at 121. For example, it is common to distinguish within
international law between “hard” law—binding forms of law such as treaties and custom—and
“soft” law—non-binding authorities such as declarations, statements of principle, and guidelines.
Jiri Toman, Quasi-Legal Standards and Guidelines for Protecting Human Rights, in GUIDE TO
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICE 217, 217-43 (Hurst Hannum ed., 4th ed. 2004). Soft
law is particularly prevalent in international human rights law, where advocates seek to develop it in
hopes that it will ultimately achieve status as hard law. In the interim, soft law serves as an
expression of policy and ideals, recommendations and guidance for domestic governments. In an
interesting twist, law and the legal system have been the subjects of such guidance. One of the first
and most enduring examples of soft law is the Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of
Prisoners adopted by the United Nations in 1957. Id. at 217. These guidelines “reflect the modern
approach of reform-minded penologists who emphasize rehabilitation and restraint of a prisoner
rather than retribution and deterrence.” Id. at 221. They also bear a striking resemblance in tone
and content to the universal maxims cited by Foucault in Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the
Prison. FOUCAULT, supra note 12, at 269-70. The international community has also adopted basic
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humanitarian intervention, non-governmental organizations and other
actors of global civil society work in partnership with governmental and
inter-governmental authorities to monitor human rights violations, build
local capacity, and transform the legal and regulatory landscape. As
such, they reflect “emerging forms of governmentality” that wield power
through knowledge, information, advocacy, and expertise.193
Whether in a framework of human rights or human security or
justice, an approach centered on governance moves away from the statecentric and law-centric approach that is traditional in international law
and incorporates other actors, such as non-governmental organizations
and the other actors of global civil society. In humanitarian intervention,
in the space created and maintained by violence, the international
community also creates government as the “matrix within which are
articulated all those dreams, schemes, strategies and manoeuvres of
authorities that seek to shape the beliefs and conduct of others in desired
directions by acting upon their will, their circumstances or their
environment.”194 Through the activities of experts—in humanitarian
intervention, that is “international” experts—it administers the local
population “through countless, often competing, local tactics of
education, persuasion, inducement, management, incitement, motivation
and encouragement.”195
These tactics or techniques of governance include law, and often it
is a dominant feature. However, international efforts to establish “the
rule of law” and protect human rights are also projects of reform and
(re)education.196 Formal governmental, inter-governmental, and quasigovernmental institutions manage and direct these projects, but they do
not do so alone. They work in cooperation or partnership with a vast
network of civil society organizations that operate at all scalar levels,
from the local to the global. Not just the nation, but also the population,
become subject to a project of reform and management in the name of
human rights and the rule of law.

guidelines delineating the appropriate roles for the judiciary, lawyers, and prosecutors and also for
the treatment of victims. Toman, supra, at 217-43.
193. CHEAH, supra note 177, at 126. See also BAXI, supra note 144, at 191. Baxi contends
that despite the involvement of activists and civil society organizations, “national, regional, and
global political, bureaucratic, and institutional actors . . . harness the prose of human rights to a
whole variety of ends of governance.” Id.
194. MILLER & ROSE, supra note 162, at 54.
195. Id. at 55.
196. CHEAH, supra note 177, at 230-67; ORFORD, supra note 3.
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V. CONCLUSION
Law has a particular set of meanings to those who are trained in it
or who work directly with it. However, because it extends its reach
throughout the social world, there is much to be learned from other
theorists who have investigated law. In some ways, law is everywhere
in everyday life; it touches quotidian interactions at home, in school, and
at work. At the same time, or perhaps as a result, law appears directly
tied to particular communities—often local, at most national. Its
pervasiveness and embeddedness can render it opaque, if not invisible.
Sometimes a direct encounter with the law—a criminal trial, a broken
contract, a contested divorce—provides a rare opportunity to experience
how law works. Other times it is a challenge—That’s not the law! Is
that the law?—that prompts closer examination. Such is the case with
international law. Fundamental questions, such as whether international
law is really law at all, encourage deeper inquiry into what it means to
be law.
Theorists from a range of disciplines have engaged in a searching
examination of what law is and how it works. Drawing upon these
contributions, a multi-dimensional view of law—including international
law—emerges. Law is enmeshed with violence and force, with
bureaucracy and rationality, and with governance and reform. If that is
law’s nature, then international law is indeed law. However, even as
law’s multi-dimensionality responds to one major question, it raises
new, and perhaps more difficult, questions. If law exists in relationship
with violence, what are the consequences of that relationship? In
particular, what are the consequences for international human rights
law? What opportunities would law disconnected from violence offer
(or foreclose)? But violence is not the only aspect of law; law is also
rational and bureaucratic. Questions arise here as well. What are the
broader implications and human costs of this form of organization and
the increasing rationalization of law? What lessons can be drawn from
(and for) the growing bureaucracy of the United Nations and the human
rights framework? How do we evaluate expertise as an instrument of
authority? Finally, law is increasingly entwined with governance. How
are law and governmentality implicated in one another? Is law displaced
by governance or has it extended its reach beyond the formal institutions
of the legal system? What are the consequences of the increasing power
of civil society, especially at the global level?
These are important questions, questions that are not easy to answer
but that provide a map for future inquiries. Humanitarian intervention
offers a powerful and revealing current example of law-making and law-
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preserving violence as well as the processes of bureaucratization in postconflict areas. Related human rights endeavors, especially in postconflict nation-building contexts, illustrate the pervasiveness of
governmentality and the ways in which it affects power relations at the
global level. With on-going international interventions occurring around
the globe, it is important to seriously consider these larger questions.
Closer examination of law’s multi-dimensional nature provides a means
for doing so.
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